There is widespread concern that an international agreement on stringent climate policies will not be reached because it would imply too high costs for fast growing economies like China. To quantify these costs we develop a general equilibrium model with fully endogenous growth. The framework includes disaggregated industrial and energy sectors, endogenous innovation, and sector-specific investments. We find that the implementation of Chinese government carbon policies until 2020 causes a welfare reduction of 0.3 percent. For the long run up to 2050 we show that welfare costs of internationally coordinated emission reduction targets lie between 3 and 8 percent. Assuming faster energy technology development, stronger induced innovation, and rising energy prices in the reference case reduces welfare losses significantly. We argue that increased urbanization raises the costs of carbon policies due to altered consumption patterns.
Introduction
China has become the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter: it consumes around fifty percent of global coal extraction and generates eighty percent of its electricity with coal. At the same time, the economic growth of China has been unprecedentedly high, with an average annual growth rate of more than ten percent over the last twenty years.
1 Future climate policies are becoming one of the top priorities for Chinese policy makers as well as for the world community, which is seeking a new international climate agreement.
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From the perspective of applied macroeconomics, it seems rewarding to inquire into the dynamic impact of restricted input use in a high-growth economy and to derive results on the size of its effects. Notably, if climate policy requires stabilization of future carbon use, the growth rates of fossil fuel inputs in China will contrast sharply with past and current income growth rates, suggesting major welfare losses with climate policies. One may also argue that a successfully growing economy is powerful in achieving a new growth trajectory. The sky-high savings and investment rates and the associated productivity development may support the necessary transition. The nexus of energy and growth is the fundamental research issue in this field. We focus on the effects of carbon policy on the economic growth.
In this paper we develop a multi-sector endogenous growth framework, including energy inputs. We argue that the assessment of climate policies, specifically in a case like China, is only accurate when we capture economic growth in an appropriate way. We use the well-known increasing-division-of-labor framework developed by Romer (1990) as a theoretical foundation of our model. Here, endogenous innovation and capital investments increase the number of goods varieties and the stock of knowledge, which supports growth by raising productivity. We extend the original theoretical framework to a multi-sector approach with energy and foreign trade; growth of each economic sector is determined endogenously. We then 1 According to World Bank data, the average annual growth rate of China was 10.1% in the periods [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] 10 .9% between 2001-2011. 2 So far, China's position has been to offer emission intensity targets but no emission cuts; we will study the different targets and their effects in detail below. Furthermore, we notice that regional pilot cap-and-trade programs are now being implemented as part of the current Chinese climate policy. This signals that the Chinese government is making efforts for the absolute emission cuts.
use the framework as a basis for a computable general equilibrium model, i.e. we calibrate the model with Chinese input output data and study the macroeconomic effects of several potential scenarios for future climate policies.
Our results indicate that the implementation of the officially announced carbon policies until 2020 incurs a welfare cost of 0.3 percent and a reduction in annual consumption growth of 0.1 percentage points. In the medium term up to 2035, where we assume more stringent emission targets, welfare costs of climate policies are substantially higher but largely depend on the assumed reference growth rate.
In the long run up to 2050, welfare costs of internationally coordinated emission reduction targets lie between 3 and 8 percent; the annual consumption growth rate is reduced by up to 0.4 percentage points.
We show the robustness of the results with respect to crucial assumptions.
Notably, assuming a favorable technical development in the energy sector allows to cut welfare cost of carbon policy in the long run by half. Moreover, introducing energy prices increase in the reference case reduces the cost of climate policies by one third. The assumption of induced innovation has a major impact: with a lower effect than in our standard model, the cost of carbon policies raises significantly, while a high effect could even entail economic benefits of climate policies in the long run. In the same way, we confirm that the chosen discount rate has a major impact on the results. We also show that increasing urbanization will lead to slightly higher costs of carbon policies.
The paper relates to the literature in three aspects. First, it contributes to the emerging strand of literature on the integration of the natural environment into endogenous growth theory. Acemoglu et al. (2012) show that the effects and the optimal timing of environmental policy in an innovation-driven growth framework with directed technical change depend on the degrees of substitution between clean and dirty inputs. The effects of carbon policies in our multi-sector approach also rely on inter-sectoral substitution, but contrary to most directed technical change models, we assume economy-wide and not purely sector-specific knowledge spillovers. 3 Bretschger and Smulders (2012) in their theoretical model derive that in a multi-sector economy increasing energy prices do not prevent an economy 3 Investments are also targeted at specific sectors in our model but we argue it is more general to assume that sector specific improvements also build on improvements in other sectors through learning effects.
from having positive innovation and growth even under the conditions of poor input substitution. In a similar way, the present model implements poor input substitution in most sectors of the economy. Popp (2002) empirically estimates the effects of energy prices on energy-efficient innovations, concluding that both energy prices and existing knowledge have strongly positive effects on innovative activities. The effects of energy prices on investments will be especially modeled in our approach. With regard to climate policies, Gans (2012) We derive from this literature a consensus that climate policies are costly but that cost depends on various factors, most importantly on the growth mechanisms and innovation. We show a concrete application of this general mechanism with the example of China.
In the field of carbon policy assessment the importance of China and its climate policy for global greenhouse gases stabilization is eminent. 4 There are various recent contributions on China's climate policy using computable general equilibrium. Huebler (2011) seriously impede the Chinese development while the impact of an 80% reduction in carbon intensity by 2050 is relatively small. 5 As reported by Financial Times, 4 Blanford et al. (2008) conclude that effective climate policy measures must include developing and emerging countries, especially China. Wolfram et al. (2012) explain that over the next decades nearly all of the growth in energy demand, is forecast to come from the developing world, suggesting there is likely to be a large increase in the demand for energy in the coming years. 5 Further contributions in this context are Zhang (1998), Garbaccio et al. (1999) , Liang et Beijing's leading climate economists believe about 7.5 percent of China's GDP in 2030 is likely to be devoted to reduce emissions. 6 These results are related to ours but the main problem with these contributions is that they are based on either static or recursive dynamic models, which do not consider inter-temporal choices.
Accordingly, these approaches cannot accommodate forward-looking savings and investment behavior as definitely required by modern endogenous growth theory.
To develop a fully endogenous growth model is theoretically and numerically demanding. We show the possibility of constructing such dynamic model and its application to China in the present paper.
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With regard to economic development in China it is generally acknowledged that pace and scale of China's economic transformation have no historical precedent, see Zhu (2012) . High output growth, sustained returns on capital, and a large trade surplus are the characteristics of China's recent development, accurately studied in Song et al. (2011) using a specially constructed growth model.
They state that China's economic transformation involve, not only rapid economic growth and sustainable capital accumulation but also shift on the economic structure and increased urbanization (see also the survey of Zheng and Kahn, 2013).
Fisher-Vanden and Ho (2007) argue that a large share of total investment in China is invested unproductively by the government in pursuit of non-economic objectives. We conclude that we have to take sectoral development and urbanization into account when analyzing emission reduction policies in a comprehensive manner. In our model, urbanization will change consumption patterns affecting carbon emissions. Moreover, our approach employs two types of capital inputs for each sector, differing in terms of productivity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical framework used for the numerical simulation model and derives the 6 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cd7466e8-971f-11de-83c5-00144feabdc0.html# axzz2kzFUbs5g 7 Other fully dynamic CGE models used to evaluate climate policies in a different context are Heggedahl and Jacobson (2011) for Norway and Bretschger et al. (2011) presenting the CITE model for Switzerland; the difference to the latter paper lies in crucial model elements like induced innovation and in the adaptation to specific issues for China like high benchmark growth, special policy targets, and special issues like the effects of urbanization. We present a largely changed version of the CITE model according to the data availability and economic structure of the country. It covers all important sectors of China's economy.
conditions for balanced growth. Section 3 describes the data and presents a calibration of the model. Section 4 presents applications of the model and the findings from the model results. Section 5 introduces urbanization to the model and analyzes the reaction of the economy when both fast urbanization and carbon policies are taking place. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The model framework 2.1 Overview Figure 1 shows a diagrammatic sketch of the model. A representative, infinitely lived household supplies primary factors labor (L), research labor (L R ), capital (K), emission permits and other inputs (V ). She allocates factor incomes between consumption and investment under perfect foresight in order to maximize inter-temporal utility. Emission permits are used in fixed proportion to energy uses based on the carbon content of the different energy sources. In order to obtain the effects of endogenous growth on long-run growth clearly, the baseline model is exempt from distortions, particularly taxes or other policies, as well as spatial considerations related to urbanization. We will distinguish between rural and urban consumers in a separate section. These two types of household are differentiated in terms of consumption preferences. In order to keep the analysis simple, we do not model regionally segmented labor markets; all sectors face the same labor supply. 
Growth mechanics
which is the standard extension-in-varieties formulation of new growth theory with 0 < κ < 1. If we assume symmetric intermediate goods, i.e. q j = q, expression (2) can be simplified to:
where X = J · q measures aggregate input in the intermediate sector. 
Capital accumulation
We assume each intermediate good needs one capital unit in order to be produced. 
On a balanced growth path, sectoral allocation in the economy is unchanged so that the output of each intermediate good remains constant, i.e. we have g q = 0.
Output growth (g Q ) is then solely driven by gains from specialization, expressed
Growth is positive, provided there are positive investments
Capital J is accumulated through investments I according to:
where t is the time index, s the spillover of induced innovation (see next Subsection) and δ t the depreciation rate. Investments depend on the input of research labor L R 9 and on other investment specific inputs, B inv , according to:
8 In Romer (1990) , capital is knowledge capital in the form of blueprints. We generalize the assumption to broad capital because we want to capture not only investments into non-physical but also into physical capital in the numerical simulations below. The latter constitutes an important channel for the effects of carbon policies. 9 This variable denotes a specific type of labor, which can be derived directly from the input/output table.
where ξ and 1 − ξ are share parameters, ω is the elasticity of substitution, J represents the aggregate spillover of capital size to research labor productivity, and z is the spillover intensity. More specifically, we assume that the invention of new goods varieties increases the stock of public knowledge proportionally to J which is then a free input into investment activities of the next period. Hence, the knowledge spillover zJ raises research labor productivity, counteracting decreasing returns to labor in investment activities. This common mechanism of new growth theory will be present both in the benchmark scenario and the policy applications.
Accordingly, carbon policies and increasing carbon prices do not affect it.
Induced Innovation
The hypothesis of induced innovation says that an increase of the price of a specific factor is a spur to innovation increasing productivity via price-induced technical to conclude that a CGE model dealing with energy necessarily needs to take this into account. Because our general spillover zJ in (6) does not change the input-output relations between reference case and policy simulation we need an additional transmission channel for increasing energy prices associated to carbon policies, which we capture with our variable s, see (5) . Specifically, we assume a positive impact of energy prices on investment productivity according to: 7
where φ ≥ 0 measures the impact of energy price p e on investment productivity s and p ref is the (constant) energy price in the benchmark development, so that
We thus assume that higher energy prices, besides having negative effects by reducing intermediate goods production (see next subsection), benefit the economy through positive learning spillovers, increasing the productivity of capital investments and leading to more efficient energy use. Of course, we will carefully calibrate φ and test the assumption φ ≥ 0 in Eqn. (7) for plausibility and robustness under different climate policy scenarios; we also discuss the case φ = 0. In separate simulation we also considered the assumption of s exclusively affecting energy productivity but did not find significant changes in the results.
We note that the introduction of spillovers in (5) and (6) does not create any rents which would violate the usual zero-profit conditions. However, spillovers z and s directly decrease production costs for all the firms, this also leads to accelerating the increase in the number of firms in the intermediate sector, reducing prices to eliminate rents.
Intermediate goods
Intermediate goods q j are produced using three essential inputs: labor L, energy E, and other input V , which includes the part of capital that is not invested productively (i.e. does not accumulate like the part of capital denoted by J):
with ϕ, ξ, and 1−ϕ−ξ being the share parameters, and the substitution elasticity between the three inputs.
11 By multiplying the expression by J, the production of intermediates is assumed to benefit from a knowledge spillover from capital accumulation, which means that the quantity of intermediate goods increases
over time with positive investments even when the quantity of the other inputs in (8) remains constant.
12 10 The main reason we distinguish between productive and non-productive capital is that a significant part of the Chinese economy is characterized by a high degree of government regulation and state-owned firms. According to previous studies in literature we thus carefully separate total capital into the two components of accumulable and constant capital, see also Section 3.
11 L is different from L R in (6) so that there is no labor reallocation between these two labor types with climate policies but our formulation of (7) captures a very similar mechanism.
12 The assumption is necessary for the calibration of the reference case (which is a balanced growth path) but not crucial for our policy evaluations, because the effect is present both in the benchmark and with the policies.
Energy sectors
Energy (E) used for intermediate production is an aggregate of electricity E ele and fossil fuels E f os according to
where σ egy is the elasticity of substitution and δ is a value share. Fossil fuels E f os are further disaggregated into coal, oil, and gas, using a Cobb-Douglas function, which is omitted for the sake of brevity.
In the model, emission is a by-product of the use of energy goods for intermediate production, investment, and consumption. We assume different carbon content for various energy resources used. 13 
Sectors and trade
Below we distinguish twelve non-energy sectors (hereafter regular sectors) and four energy sectors. The output composite B in (1) 
tr 1+tr (10) where α d is the share of domestic use in total output Y and tr is the elasticity of substitution between D and P . There is imperfect substitution between domestically produced goods Y and imported goods M :
where ν and 1 − ν are the value shares and η is the elasticity of substitution. We assume that foreign prices are given and asset trade is disregarded in the model, so that goods trade is balanced in each period.
14 In each sector, the market clearing condition requires that supply equals demand.
Welfare and Consumption
Total welfare is derived from individual utilities according to:
where ρ is the utility discount rate and θ is the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. C represents an aggregate of different goods, consisting of consumption of a regular sector output composite (C y ) and an energy aggregate (C e ) with an elasticity of substitution (σ C ):
The regular sector output composite (C y ) is given by a Cobb-Douglas function, according to:
where subscript ne is a set containing twelve non-energy goods, β ne shows the consumption shares of each goods respectively. We further disaggregate the energy composite into fossil aggregate and electricity consumption with an elasticity of substitution σ ce :
f os σce σce−1 (15) where ι is the value share of electricity consumption in total energy aggregate and the fossil aggregate (C f os ) is given by
14 It is true that China experiences trade surplus due to its export-oriented development strategy. If we embody this fact into our benchmark, the effect of trade surplus will exist both in benchmark and policy scenarios. When we compare the effects of carbon policy on growth to the benchmark case, such effects are marginal because most of them are canceled out. Hence, the assumption of balanced trade is not likely to affect our estimation results significantly.
where α coal , α oil , α gas are the respective energy source consumption share in fossil aggregate with α coal + α oil + α gas = 1. There are good reasons to use this table: 1) it contains sufficient information on intermediate and factor inputs of the different sectors; 2) it provides information on the production structure of the four major energy sources; 3) it describes demand for non-energy and energy goods; 4) it captures necessary information on investment and R&D; 5) it distinguishes between rural and urban consumers.
We introduce twelve non-energy (regular) sectors which are agriculture (agr), mining (min), chemical industry (chm), machinery industry (mch), other industries (oin), construction (con), transport (trn), banking and financial services (bnk), private services (pse), government and public services (gse), real estate (rea), water supply industry (wat) and four energy sectors, i.e. electricity (ele), coal (coa), oil (oil), and gas (gas).
Capital share
An important issue for a dynamic model is the capital share of the economy. 16 Because we also include (sector-specific) non-accumulative capital the average capital share of the benchmark economy amounts to around 40 percent on average.
Other assumptions
The prices of all goods are assumed to be constant in the benchmark, which is the usual assumption for CGE models. 17 We will test the impact of increasing energy prices due to increasing scarcities in a separate section below. To determine induced investment reflected in (7) we refer to the estimation of Popp (2002) who reports a long run elasticity between 0.354 and 0.421 for (energy-related) technology patents with respect to energy prices. We use a value of φ of 0.2 in all the sectors in the first part of the study and test for sensitivity in a separate section below. 16 In the benchmark, the 25% applies for all the sectors, which is a necessary assumption for balanced growth. We run sensitivity check with lower and higher value of capital share, and find higher share of capital will lead to a relatively higher cost for the same emission reduction because higher capital share means lower share of energy input in production, which potentially increases the productivity of energy, and hence carbon reduction policy will raise the energy prices further relative to lower capital share case. In contrary, lower capital share declines the cost for carbon mitigation. However, such changes in cost are small. 17 Specifically in the dynamic model setup, the price path over time in terms of present value in the model is calibrated to decline with a rate of 1/(1 + r), where r is the interest rate.
interest rate, depreciation. 
Time frames
We consider three different time frames for our analysis: short term (2010-2020), mid term (2010-2035), and long term (2010-2050); they differ in terms of reference growth rates and policy targets. We construct three different baseline scenarios that are designed to reflect different time frames with corresponding differences in assumed reference growth rates. The reference growth rate in the short run is assumed to be 7 percent per year, based on the 12th Five-Year-Plan report of the Chinese government, which is our reference to study the carbon policies up to 2020. Two different reference growth rates (4 percent and 7 percent) are used for the analysis of medium run scenarios with a focus on economic effects of carbon policies advocated by the International Energy Agency (IEA). In the long run, the economy is assumed to grow at an average annual rate of 4 percent in the benchmark; carbon policy targets are based on international burden sharing rules which are currently discussed for a global climate agreement. The real interest rate is assumed to be 4% following World Bank data. According to the calibration procedure, the discount rate is implicitly determined by the real interest rate, the reference growth rate of output, and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
Benchmark
All policies scenarios are compared to a benchmark. In our multi-sector economy, the benchmark is assumed to be a balanced growth path meaning that all sectors grow at the same steady-state rate; i.e. there is no structural change. The population is assumed to be constant over time (a realistic assumption for China); Overall, we evaluate six climate policy scenarios: two government target scenario in the short run (CHN 40 and CHN 45); one scenario in the mid-term, 18 As in 2010, 21% emission intensity reduction has been achieved compared to the level of 2005. China needs a reduction of emission intensity by 24% and 30% in 2020 from 2010 level to reach the 40% and 45% target between 2005 and 2020 respectively. 19 The target of the U.S. is based on the UNFCCC report. http://unfccc.int/meetings/ copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5264.php. 20 We note that these two scenarios show only what China should do disregarding the policies implemented in other countries. One way of introducing policy effects of foreign countries in our one region model framework is to vary the value of trade elasticity. If foreign countries implement less stringent carbon policy, the prices of fossil energies in China are higher than abroad. This will increase the incentives to import goods rather than producing in domestic firms. Hence, trade elasticity rise, as there is an increased preference for foreign goods. On contrary, we can decrease the value for trade elasticities to formulate the case where foreign countries implement more stringent carbon policies than China. The appendix shows such sensitivity analysis. Table   2 summarizes all scenarios implemented in this section. Figure 3 shows the growth path of aggregate consumption over time across scenarios. Given the high growth rate consumption increases by a factor of two between 2010 and 2020. For the two government scenarios CHN 40 and CHN 45 we obtain a growth rate of around 6.91 percent against 7 percent in the benchmark.
Results of cost estimations 4.2.1 Short run (2010-2020)
The discounted welfare loss of the two climate policies is 0.32 percent and 0.34 percent. In scenario ZERO, the welfare loss associated with keeping the emission 
Medium run (2010-2035)
For the medium run we consider two reference growth rates: 7 and 4 percent.
Assuming the 7 percent growth from the short run the welfare loss is 7.23 percent in the IEA450 scenario with an average growth rate of consumption at 6.57 even with the normal assumption of a positive discount rate. The reason is that emission cuts have higher costs with a higher income level. Specifically, in the ZERO scenario it can be seen that the cost of the policy for the first 10 years is 0.84 percent, while the cost for the next 15 years is 4.51 percent. Second, and related to that, it is not beneficial but costly to delay emissions to later periods.
The reason is that an earlier redirection of inputs towards investment and growth is beneficial in our growth model. Notably, in IEA450, emission reduction mostly happens in the last 10 years (2025-2035) which leads to a substantial increase in welfare cost of carbon policy.
Suggesting that 7 percent annual growth up to 2035 is a too ambitious target we now reduce the reference growth rate of the economy to 4 percent in the baseline. It can be seen from Figure 3 that a lower reference growth rate makes it easier for the economy to reach the emission target, as could be expected. Consumption growth in the two policy scenarios is now 3.88 percent. Remarkably, the welfare loss in both scenarios is less than one fifth of the value with 7 percent reference growth (1.34 and 0.94 percent). Hence, even in our endogenous growth model, the cost of carbon emission mitigation increases drastically with the reference growth rate of the economy. There are two reasons for this huge difference. First, a lower GDP growth rate means lower CO2 emissions so that the differences between baseline and emission mitigation targets become smaller.
Less resource and effort are required for the emission reduction with lower GDP growth. Second, in our fully fledged intertemporal approach, a lower growth rate of the economy implies a higher discount rate 21 which reduces the present value of future cost. As the welfare loss is computed as the accumulative discounted present value over time, the estimated cost is smaller compared to the case of high growth. 
Long run (2010-2050)
For the long run we assume the reference growth rate of the Chinese economy being 4 percent per year. Enforcing a constant emission level over time (scenario ZERO) the growth rate of consumption becomes 3.82 percent, which is somewhat lower than the rate in the medium run. Because development is less dynamic and the time horizon is longer, we obtain a welfare loss of 2.57 percent for this policy.
The first case of burden sharing from the global perspective (CER524) suggests similar results, the welfare loss amounts to 3.10 percent. CER361 showcases the most stringent climate policy scenario. The growth rate of consumption drops to 3.54 percent and welfare loss rises up to 8.33 percent, which is the highest value we obtain in the present setup.
Given the various modeling and parameter choices we made to obtain these results we have to do extensive sensitivity analysis, to which we turn next. 
Sensitivity analysis

Green technologies
In addition to general efficiency improvements there are two specific technical approaches to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. One is to develop and use renewable energies which are CO2 free. To promote renewable energies China has enacted its Renewable Energy Law. A specific goal for renewables is also set out in China's Results in Figure 4 confirm that cost for carbon mitigation can be reduced if renewables are introduced as a substitute for polluting energies. As compared to our previous results, welfare losses decrease in all three carbon policies. The reduction is much larger when technologies such as CCS can be used to decline the carbon content of fossil energies. In the most stringent scenario CER361, welfare loss of carbon policy drops from 8.33 percent to 4.5 percent, accounting for approximately half of the total welfare loss. Accordingly, aggregate consumption growth is higher than in the case without a specific technology development.
We note that the improvement of efficiency in CCS and the expansion of renewable energy in electricity generation involve additional investments which are excluded from the calculation. Hence, our estimation of the contribution of exogenous technical change to cost reduction may be overestimated.
Energy price effects
Based on the theory of nonrenewable resources as developed in Hotelling (1931) , the optimum extraction path for non-renewable resources is one along which the resource rent increases at the rate of interest. To reflect the development path of energy prices according to the Hotelling framework for nonrenewable resources, we run separate scenarios (i.e. a series of P R scenarios with different time frames and growth rates of output) assuming that energy prices increase with the interest rate, i.e. by four percent per year in our numerical simulation. As illustrated in Figure 5 , higher energy price discourages energy consumption and increases prices of consumer goods, especially energy intensive goods. Under such conditions, consumption growth is lower than in the reference case, where energy prices are assumed to be flat. The average short run growth rate of consumption is 6.83 percent (level of reference is 7 percent). Consumption is not very sensitive to the prices in the short run but significant in the longer run, especially in the scenarios with relatively low growth rates of output.
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To determine induced investment reflected in (7) we refer to the estimation of Popp (2002) , who reports a long run elasticity between 0.354 and 0.421 for (energy-related) technology patents with respect to energy prices. As shown in Table 4 , the positive effect of induced innovation alleviates the negative impact of energy price increase. The positive effect increases in the value of φ. So far we have assumed φ to be 0.2, the consequences of reducing it to 0 (no learning 22 The welfare loss of the path with increasing energy prices is 2.2 percent relative to the reference case with constant energy prices in the short run. The loss of welfare increases to 5.5 percent with a growth rate of 6.68 percent per year in the mid-term time until 2035. If the output grows at 4 percent per year in the reference, the loss of welfare increases to 8.5 percent with a growth rate of 3.51 percent per year in aggregate consumption. The long-run effect is much stronger, aggregate consumption growth drops from 4 percent to 3.33 percent, accounting for 12.44 percent welfare loss.
spillovers from increases energy prices) and doubling to 0.4 are also given in Table   4 . Induced innovation (the magnitude of φ) has a significant impact on the effects of carbon policies. It can convert a relatively high welfare loss in the case of no induced innovation (φ = 0) into a welfare gain, constituting a "win-win" situation which one might call successful "green growth". Based on empirical evidence and because we do not want to assume a value which is overly optimistic we stick with φ = 0.2 in the main analysis.
In absence of induced innovation, the welfare loss of the economy is about 12.44% under the Hotelling pricing assumption. With regard to energy price development, all three long-run carbon reduction scenarios lead to an increase of energy price of more than 4 percent (our Hotelling case), meaning that carbon policies further increase the price of energy. Hence, if we think that Hotelling forces will come into play in the future, the estimated welfare losses above implicitly contain the effects due to the Hotelling price change. It is then illuminating to subtract the effects of the Hotelling energy price path from our estimations.
23 Figure 6 shows that, after separating the Hotelling energy price effect, the maximum welfare loss from CER361 declines to 6.20 percent. Put differently, the average carbon budget per capita per year in the benchmark has to be around 13.4 tons to sustain annual growth of 4 percent until 2050. The Hotelling energy price path reduces the carbon budget to 7 tons, which accounts for up to 80 percent emission reductions in the carbon policies scenarios. We conclude that in a world with increasing energy prices, emissions will be implicitly reduced through the price effects (both negative price increasing effect and positive price-induced innovation effect), and the required policy efforts to reach long-run emission targets become substantially lower, which also applies to the welfare losses. 
Discounting
The choice of the discount rate will affect the estimation in the long run. The model calibration for the above analysis implicitly assumes a discount rate of 1.6 percent in the model. The social planner might prefer a different discount rate to market participants and use a value of 4 percent, which is frequently used in climate policy. Using the reported consumption path from the model and together with the discount rate of 4 percent, the welfare level associated with the new discount rate can be calculated using equation 12 separately. We call this a "static approach" to welfare estimation. The higher discount rate leads to a sharp reduction of welfare loss. The cost of carbon mitigation policy in scenarios CER524, CER361, ZERO now become 0.81 percent, 3.1 percent, and 0.79 percent, respectively. The reason is that the planner values future consumption losses due to climate policy less than the households.
Instead, a "dynamic approach" analysis is conducted if we impose the higher discount rate to the individuals. The difference between the static and dynamic approach is that interest rate will be adjusted accordingly in a dynamic context.
The intertemporal optimization of consumption (Keynes-Ramsey rule) suggests that the market interest rate has to rise as well, in our case from 4 percent to 6.4
percent. The reason is that the benchmark path is determined by a given growth rate. It is then still true that higher discounting reduces the cost of climate policies. But the welfare loss does not decline by a large amount compared to the original estimation since a higher interest rate makes it more expensive to invest in capital and to substitute for fading energy input. This is confirmed by the results from Table 5 which shows lower growth rates of consumption in the case of 4 percent discounting compared to the case of 1.6 percent discounting. 
Substitution elasticities
Finally, additional sensitivity analysis on the values of the substitution elasticities are conducted to check the robustness of our results. The Appendix summarizes these results on parameter sensitivity, indicating the high reliability and robustness of our results on the cost of carbon policy.
Results of structural change
Because the model contains many sectors with important intersectoral linkages, the structural aspects of development are worth considering. In the reference case, all the sectors grow at the rate of aggregate output. But carbon policies have an impact on sectoral growth and thus change the sectoral structure of the economy. In general, energy intensive sectors tend to shrink while knowledge intensive sectors are able to grow faster.
As shown in Figure 7 , climate policies affect sectoral development. In the general model, technological change and efficiency improvement stem from two substitution effects: (i) substitution between energy input and other inputs (for instance, work labor), because the price of other inputs is relatively cheaper than energy since emission cap implicitly increases the price of energy; (ii) investment in research and the spillover effects from research labor. Innovative sectors which are capital intensive in the baseline can adjust easier and alleviate the shocks from Energy intensive sectors such as Mining industry (min), machinery (mch), construction (con), transportation (trn) shrink compared to sectors such as agriculture (agr), which is labor intensive and private service sector (pse), which is capital intensive. Particularly, the min sector, as a source of primary energies, will experience a decline in production since less fossil energies are demanded in the future. It is worth noting that water supply industry (wat) declines substantially as well. This confirms the information that converting primary energy into end use energy requires a great deal of water. Hence, demand for water declines as the energy sectors shrink.
As targeted by the policy, the energy sectors suffers from the adopted policies. Within the energy sectors, two substitution effects are effective. The first is substitution between the three fossil energies. Energy sources with higher carbon content can be replaced by sources with lower carbon content since higher carbon content implies that higher tax is imposed for that energy source. It is clear from the figure that coal suffers the most. It shrinks with a rate of between -1.22 percent in ZERO and -4.15 percent in CER361, followed by oil, which still grows at a rate of 0.74 percent in ZERO but shrinks with a rate of -1.47 percent in CER361. The change of the growth rate in gas is insignificant between ZERO and CER524. To achieve the most stringent target in CER361, the production of gas has to keep almost at current level. The dependency on natural gas will have to increase since it is relatively cleaner energy source compared to others.
The second effect is substitution between electricity and fossil energies. Acceleration of electrification makes it relatively easier to substitute. Specifically in China, substantial investments in power plants and grids construction enlarged the penetration rate of electricity distribution and electric equipment. However, most of the power plants in China are still coal-fired, which means electricity is carbon intensive relative to, for example, gas. This can lead to an "inverse" substitution between electricity and fossil bundles. We can see from the figure that the growth rate of electricity is much lower than two of the three fossil energies in all scenarios. The decline in electricity growth is large. It drops to -0.55 percent in ZERO and -2.68 percent in CER361, which provides evidence that the second inverse substitution effect is dominant. emission. With the emission reduction, total energy consumption also declines.
Urbanization and sectoral change
As predicted by the United Nations cess over time. 25 It is predicted to further climb to near 60% in 2020 and around 66% in 2030. 26 We explore the long-run effects of urbanization on sectoral growth in this section.
Depending on the region where one lives, people have different consumption bundle preferences, which are reflected by parameters in consumption equations.
27
The urbanization rate is exogenously given in the model for simplicity. 28 We assume the urbanization ratio increases to 60 percent in 2020 and continues to rise up to 66% in 2030 (hereafter U RB). The rate of urbanization in 2050 will reach 78 percent, converging to current level of US.
When people move from rural to urban regions as predicted, total rural con- 26 The world average urbanization ratio in developed countries 85%, and China's urbanization still lags behind the industrial development, which leaves huge room for further development. 27 Explicitly, ζ in equation 13, β ne in equation 14, ι in equation 15, and α coa , α oil , α gas in equation 16 are distinguished between regions according to Input-output table data calibration. 28 The government is expected to be careful when allocating fiscal spending as it carries out the new urbanization plans. One precondition for urbanization should be ensuring a sufficient and stable supply of agricultural produce, which will require improved efficiency in agricultural production, based on advanced technology and management. In addition, the provision of housing, social security and education for migrant workers and their children once they settle in the cities, will also present problems that must be solved during the urbanization process.
the base year show that people living in cities consume more than rural residents.
Hence, welfare of the whole economy increases with the urbanization process (by 0.1 percent).
On the sector level, the agricultural sector (agr) shrinks relative to the reference case with an average growth rate of 3.78 percent. The construction sector (con) benefits from urbanization with an average growth rate of 4.17 percent. It is followed by the water supply industry (wat), with an average growth rate of 4.15 percent, and sectors which are important for city consumers grow, for instance, machinery (mch) and public services (gse). All four energy sectors (ele, coa, oil, gas) grow faster compared to the reference scenario, showing that city residents consume more energy goods or energy intensive goods compared to rural household. The increase in gas is higher than that of other energy sources. Table 6 provides the results when carbon policies (CER524, CER361 and ZERO) are implemented in a growing economy with urbanization. As expected, the growth rate of consumption declines and the aggregate welfare loss rises when more stringent climate policies are implemented. Welfare losses in ZERO, CER524, CER361 are 2.68%, 3.24% and 8.62%, respectively. The welfare losses are slightly higher compared to the scenarios without consideration of urbanization. This is due to the fact that urbanization increases the demand for energy goods or energy intensive products. Sectoral diversification follows the similar patterns as described in the last section. Energy intensive sectors decrease relatively more while labor capital intensive sectors are able to adjust and alleviate the effects of climate policies.
When urbanization is taking place, sectoral growth changes slightly. As shown in Table 7 , sectors which produce goods that are more demanded by urban household, such as mch, con, gse, wat, grow at a higher rate, while the growth rates of other sectors (e.g. agr ) decline.
Conclusions
Using a multisector endogenous growth model, the paper derives the costs of carbon policies in China. We argue that growth dynamics constitute the crucial model element permitting reliable calculation of the effects. Intersectoral linkages and spillover effects are also important drivers of macroeconomic development.
Capturing the energy sector, with energy as an essential input to production in different sectors, in an accurate way is crucial for the results. More detailed modeling of the interaction between energy input and economic growth results in a more precise estimation of the cost of climate policies.
Our estimation results show that it is significantly easier for a growing economy to achieve stringent emission intensity reduction targets than absolute emission The overall assessment of climate policies in China has to include the benefits of reduced temperature rise, which is not treated in this paper. It would involve including important issues such as uncertainty, tipping points, and time lags in the carbon cycle. Nevertheless, we base our policy targets for the long run on an internationally shared carbon budget which appears to be within a realistic range. Provided that the net benefit of climate policy on a global scale is strongly positive, this suggests that also for a large country like China, climate policy is beneficial, provided it is based on a broad international agreement.
There are various possible extensions of our model. Various provinces in China are very different in terms of income level, energy use, and economic structures.
Hence, a multi-region setup would be helpful, to include provincial differences which are especially important when policies across regions are different. Moreover, an endogenous mechanism for the determination of urbanization and ruralurban migration could be included for further analysis. Extending the modeling of the electricity sector to include a comprehensive bottom-up model part for various generation technologies and transmission grid network could also be useful for energy studies.
7 Appendix: sensitivity analysis on substitution elasticities This section shows some sensitivity analysis on elasticity of substitutions used in the numerical model. We vary the value of Armington trade elasticities η and elasticity of substitution between energy sources in intermediate production. The results are shown in Table 8 . As we expected, lowering trade elasticities makes it difficult to substitute between domestically produced goods and imported goods. That is, household consumption is more domestic dependent compared to higher values. As the prices of goods produced in home country are now relatively expensive because carbon policies increases the input price of energy, people now can buy less goods with the same amount of money. Moreover, consumers are not able to buy more imported goods as a substitute as the deline in trade elasticities. Hence, lowering trade elasticities results in higher welfare loss and lower consumption growth.
Energy substitution elasticity affects the intermediate production, and hence the final output. Lower value means all energy sources are not substitutable, while higher value suggests easy substitution between sources. It is obvious that higher substitution elasticitity gives firms more flexibility in adapting to price change due to carbon policies, making it less costly to implementing emission reduction polices. On the contrary, lower substitution elasticity indicates the rigidity in changing production inputs, expensive sources are still heavily required for production. This leads to higher cost to implement carbon policy.
However, all these robustness check suggests that our cost estimation are stable in magnitude. The results are not very sensitive to the elasticities. Of course, we can run analysis for all other elasticities. As from our experience, the above two are the most relevant to this paper.
